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NOTE 
Honey Badger Does Care About First 
Amendment Protections in Trademark Law 




I.  INTRODUCTION 
In his viral YouTube video, The Crazy Nastyass Honey Badger, comedian 
Christopher Gordon narrates a honey badger’s actions as it hunts cobras and 
eats larvae from a beehive: “But look, the honey badger doesn’t care.  It’s get-
ting stung like a thousand times.  It doesn’t give a shit.”1  Shortly after Gordon’s 
video went viral, Drape Creative, Inc. and Papyrus-Recycled Greetings, Inc. 
began producing greeting cards with catchphrases from Gordon’s YouTube 
video even though the companies did not have a licensing agreement with Gor-
don.2  Subsequently, in Gordon v. Drape Creative, Inc., Gordon sued those two 
companies for trademark infringement.3  
Trademarks assist the public in identifying the source of a good, service, 
or product. 4  However, trademarks often develop their own social meaning 
beyond their source-identifying function, like “Google” or “Band-Aid.”5  
  
* B.S., Culver-Stockton College, 2017; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of 
Law, 2020. Thank you to Professor Dennis Crouch for suggesting this topic, and thank you 
to the editorial staff of the Missouri Law Review for their helpful insight during the editing 
process.  
 1. Christopher Gordon, The Crazy Nastyass Honey Badger, YOUTUBE (Jan. 18, 
2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4r7wHMg5Yjg&t=3s [perma.cc/HRH7-
CK72].  Gordon’s video received over ninety million views on YouTube and has its 
own Wikipedia page and mobile app. Id.; see also The Crazy Nastyass Honey Badger, 
WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Crazy_Nastyass_Honey_Badger 
[perma.cc/7HHZ-SASQ] (last visited Apr. 2, 2019).  
 2. Gordon v. Drape Creative, Inc., 909 F.3d 257, 262 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 3. Id.  Foul and abusive language cannot be suppressed merely because society 
finds it offensive. In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330, 1351–52 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. granted 
sub nom. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 782 (2019).  Moreover, the Lanham Act’s prohi-
bition on registration of immoral and scandalous trademarks is not based on sufficient 
justification to suppress First Amendment speech protections. Id. at 1355.   
 4. 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2.3 (5th ed.). 
 5. Thomas M. Byron, Spelling Confusion: Implications of the Ninth Circuit’s 
View of the “Explicitly Misleading” Prong of the Rogers Test, 19 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 
1, 3–4 (2011). 
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Trademarks are frequently used for non-source-identifying purposes in expres-
sive works such as song titles, video games, or greeting cards.6  In these in-
stances, overly broad interpretations of trademark rights may endanger First 
Amendment free speech values.7  Additionally, in trademark infringement 
suits, courts inconsistently apply various tests, including the Rogers test and 
the likelihood of confusion test, to determine whether use of a particular trade-
mark is infringement, adding another barrier to the protection of free expres-
sion.8   
In Gordon v. Drape Creative, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit allowed Gordon to pursue his trademark claims against the 
greeting card companies.9  But the court’s holding restricts First Amendment 
freedom of expression and adds more confusion to an already murky area of 
law, causing internal tension in the Ninth Circuit.  The Gordon decision also 
drives a deeper wedge into a circuit split on the issue of First Amendment pro-
tections within trademark law, making this issue ripe for the United States Su-
preme Court to review.  This Note argues trademark laws should be interpreted 
to avoid collision with constitutional free speech doctrine, meaning confusion 
may need to be tolerated sometimes for the sake of preserving free speech.10  
Part II relays the facts and holding of Gordon.  Part III provides legal back-
ground for the issues presented in Gordon.  Part IV relates the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision and reasoning in Gordon, and Part V comments on the implications 
of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion. 
  
 6. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating, 
“Trademarks often fill in gaps in our vocabulary and add a contemporary flavor to our 
expressions. Once imbued with such expressive value, the trademark becomes a word 
in our language and assumes a role outside the bounds of trademark law.”). 
 7. Brief Amici Curiae of 37 Intellectual Property Law Professors in Support of 
Appellees’ Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at 4, Gordon v. Drape 
Creative, Inc., 909 F.3d 257 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 16-56715); William McGeveran, Four 
Speech Goals for Trademark Law, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 
1205, 1206 (2008). 
 8. See infra Section III. 
 9. 909 F.3d 257, 260 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 10. Gordon v. Drape Creative, Inc., 909 F.3d 257, 271–72 (9th Cir. 2018); see 
McGeveran, supra note 7, at 1213; William McGeveran & Mark P. McKenna, Confu-
sion Isn’t Everything, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253, 300 (2013) (stating, “In some sets 
of cases that raise particularly significant conflicts with other values while routinely 
posing little serious risk of passing off, courts should disregard confusion entirely.”). 
2
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II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
In 2015, Plaintiff Christopher Gordon filed a trademark infringement ac-
tion under the Lanham Act11 against Defendants Drape Creative, Inc. (“DCI”) 
and Papyrus-Recycling Greetings, Inc. (“PRG”) (“Defendants,” collectively) 
for using catchphrases from Gordon's popular YouTube video.12  PRG, a greet-
ing card manufacturer, is a subsidiary of DCI, a Missouri greeting card design 
studio.13  Gordon is a comedian most known for his YouTube video titled The 
Crazy Nastyass Honey Badger.14  In his video, Gordon narrates National Geo-
graphic footage of a honey badger, using catchphrases such as “Honey Badger 
Don’t Give a Shit” (“HBDGS”) and “Honey Badger Don’t Care” (“HBDC”) 
to describe the honey badger’s behavior.15  In February 2011, Gordon began 
producing and selling items with the HBDC and HBDGS marks, including 
books, calendars, t-shirts, and mugs.16  Shortly thereafter, Gordon copyrighted 
his narration in the YouTube video and registered HBDC with the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) for various classes of goods, 
which included greeting cards.17  However, Gordon never registered HBDGS 
with USPTO.18   
In 2012, Gordon’s licensing agent secured agreements with two compa-
nies, Zazzle, Inc. and The Duck Company, for honey badger themed products, 
including greeting cards.19  That same year, Gordon’s licensing agent met with 
PRG to discuss licensing honey badger themed greeting cards.20  However, un-
like Zazzle, Inc. and The Duck Company, PRG never signed a licensing agree-
ment with Gordon.21  Nonetheless, PRG began producing its own line of honey 
badger greeting cards in June 2012.22   
PRG sold a total of seven different greeting cards with Gordon’s catch-
phrases.23  Of the seven, two were election cards showing a honey badger wear-
ing a patriotic hat and stating “The Election’s Coming.”24  On the inside, one 
card read “Me and Honey Badger don’t give a $#%@!” and the other said 
  
 11. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2012).  The Lanham Act is the federal statute governing 
trademarks.  It addresses activities such as trademark infringement, trademark dilution, 
and unfair competition.  
 12. Gordon, 909 F.3d at 263. 
 13. Id. at 261.   
 14. Id.; Christopher Gordon (@czg123), supra note 1. 
 15. Gordon, 909 F.3d at 261. 
 16. Id. at 261. 
 17. Id.  
 18. Id. at 261–62.  
 19. Id. at 262.  
 20. Id.  
 21. Id.  
 22. Id.  
 23. Id.  
 24. Id.  
3
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“Honey Badger and me just don’t care.”25  Two birthday cards pictured a honey 
badger saying either “It’s Your Birthday!” or “Honey Badger Heard It’s Your 
Birthday.”26  Inside, both cards read “Honey Badger Don’t Give a Shit.”27  Two 
Halloween cards portrayed a honey badger standing next to a pumpkin and 
stated “Halloween is Here.”28  Inside, the cards read either “Honey Badger 
don’t give a $#*%” or “Honey Badger don’t give a s---.”29  Finally, one card 
resembled a Twitter page and depicted a series of messages from Honey-
Badger@don’tgiveas---.30  The front stated “Just killed a cobra. Don’t give a 
s---”; “Just ate a scorpion. Don’t give a s---”; and “Rolling in fire ants. Don’t 
give a s---.”31  Inside, the card read “Your Birthday’s here… I give a s---.”32  
The back of each card displayed PRG’s mark and listed websites for both DCI 
and PRG.33 
In June 2015, Gordon filed an action under the Lanham Act against De-
fendants alleging trademark infringement.34  The United States District Court 
for the Central District of California granted summary judgment for Defend-
ants.35  The district court found Defendants’ greeting cards were expressive 
works,36 triggering use of the Rogers test to bar all of Gordon’s claims.37  The 
Rogers test is a two-pronged inquiry that generally provides that the Lanham 
Act shall not apply unless the underlying work has no artistic relevance what-
soever, or, if the work has some artistic relevance, the Lanham Act does not 
apply unless the work explicitly misleads consumers as to the source or content 
of the work.38  The Rogers test balances two competing interests: the public 
interest in avoiding confusion about the source of a product and the public in-
terest in freedom of expression.39  In granting summary judgment, the district 
  
 25. Id.  
 26. Id.  
 27. Id.  
 28. Id.  
 29. Id. at 262–63. 
 30. Id. at 263.  
 31. Id.  
 32. Id.  
 33. Id.  
 34. Id.  “The Lanham Act . . . ‘creates a comprehensive framework for regulating 
the use of trademarks and protecting them against infringement, dilution, and unfair 
competition.’” Id. (quoting Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand 
Mgmt., 618 F.3d 1025, 1030 (9th Cir. 2010)); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2012). 
 35. Gordon, 909 F.3d at 257. 
 36. “‘Expressive’ uses of trademarks convey an articulable message rather than, 
or in addition to, the traditional function of source identification.” William McGeveran, 
Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV. 49, 54 (2010). 
 37. Gordon, 909 F.3d at 263; see also Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 
1989). 
 38. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999.  
 39. Id. 
4
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court found that Defendants’ use of Gordon’s mark was not explicitly mislead-
ing because Defendants did not make “an affirmative statement of the plain-
tiff’s sponsorship or endorsement.”40 
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 
Gordon argued that Defendants’ greeting cards were not expressive works en-
titled to First Amendment protection and that Defendants’ use of Gordon’s 
catchphrases were not “artistically relevant” to the greeting cards.41  Gordon 
also urged that even if the Rogers test did apply, Defendants’ use of his trade-
mark was “explicitly misleading.”42  In response, Defendants argued that their 
greeting cards were expressive works that did not identify Gordon as the 
source.43  Therefore, Defendants urged that they were entitled to the application 
of the Rogers test and protection under the First Amendment.44  
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the 
case for further fact-finding on “whether defendants’ use of Gordon’s mark is 
artistically relevant to their cards.”45  In doing so, the Ninth Circuit held that 
use of a mark is “artistically relevant” when the mark relates to Defendants’ 
work and Defendants add their own artistic expression beyond that of the 
mark.46   
Shortly after the Ninth Circuit published its opinion, Defendants filed a 
petition for panel rehearing and for rehearing en banc.47  The petition urged 
that the Ninth Circuit’s decision “create[d] considerable confusion” in applying 
the Rogers test to evaluate artistic relevance.48  Additionally, thirty-seven law 
professors filed an amicus brief, arguing that trademark law, unlike copyright 
law,49 does not protect creators and their creations but rather protects the 
source-identifying function of trademarks.50  The amicus curiae argued that 
Gordon’s requirement of an artistry inquiry “threatens Rogers’ protection 
across a broad range of works and creates a conflict with copyright law and 
  
 40. Gordon, 909 F.3d at 269. 
 41. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant Christopher Gordon at 22–23, Gordon v. Drape 
Creative, Inc., 897 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 16-56715). 
 42. Id. at 23.  
 43. Appellee’s Brief at 25–26, Gordon v. Drape Creative, Inc., 897 F.3d 1184 (9th 
Cir. 2018) (No. 16-56715). 
 44. Id.  
 45. Gordon, 897 F.3d at 1196. 
 46. Id.  
 47. Appellees’ Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, Gordon v. 
Drape Creative, Inc., 897 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 05-1631). 
 48. Id. at 17.  
 49. Brief Amici Curiae of 37 Intellectual Property Law Professors in Support of 
Appellees’ Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at 1, Gordon v. Drape 
Creative, Inc., 897 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 05-1631). 
 50. Id.  
5
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with prior decisions of [the Ninth] and other circuits.”51  The amicus curiae 
concluded by calling for a decision consistent with Rogers and its progeny.52 
The Ninth Circuit granted rehearing and issued a superseding opinion.53  
The Ninth Circuit again reversed and remanded the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment and also created new requirements for the second prong of 
the Rogers test.54  In its revised opinion, the Ninth Circuit resolved the first 
prong of the Rogers test against Gordon, finding that Defendants’ use of the 
honey badger phrases was artistically relevant.55  When considering Rogers’ 
second prong, however, the Ninth Circuit rejected the district court’s standard 
of “an affirmative statement of the plaintiff’s sponsorship or endorsement” and 
added two subfactors to be considered when analyzing whether use of a mark 
is explicitly misleading.56  The first is “the degree to which the junior user uses 
the mark in the same ways as the senior user.”57  The second is “the extent to 
which the junior user has added his or her own expressive content to the work 
beyond the mark itself.”58  The Ninth Circuit also expanded the Rogers test to 
include a “likelihood of confusion” analysis if both prongs of the Rogers test 
are met.59  Holding that Defendants’ use was artistically relevant as a matter of 
law, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case for further fact-finding of whether 
Defendants’ use was explicitly misleading.60   
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Trademark law serves a dual purpose in protecting consumers against de-
ception and confusion while protecting the producer’s infringed trademark as 
property.61  Generally, these two goals complement one another.62  These ends 
are achieved through the trademark holder’s right of action for trademark in-
fringement under the Federal Trademark Act of 1946, otherwise known as the 
Lanham Act.63  
  
 51. Id.  
 52. Id. at 16.   
 53. Gordon v. Drape Creative Inc., 909 F.3d 257, 271–72 (9th Cir. 2018).  
 54. Id. at 271–72. 
 55. Id. at 269.  
 56. Id. at 269–71. 
 57. Id. at 270.  A junior user is a subsequent user of a mark that has already been 
filed with the USPTO or used by another, the senior user.   The junior user’s mark is 
then called the “junior mark,” and the senior user’s mark is called the “senior mark.” 
 58. Id. at 270–71.   
 59. Id. at 264–65.  
 60. Id. at 271.  
 61. MCCARTHY, supra note 4, at § 2:2. 
 62. Id.  
 63. Gordon, 909 F.3d at 270–71; Byron, supra note 5, at 2. 
6
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Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act protects trademark holders against false 
advertising and infringement.64  The USPTO defines trademark infringement 
as “the unauthorized use of a trademark . . . on or in connection with goods 
and/or services in a manner that is likely to cause confusion, deception, or mis-
take about the source of the goods and/or services.”65  Traditionally, trademark 
infringement rulings did not violate the First Amendment because commercial 
speech did not receive constitutional protection.66  Commercial speech is “a 
word, name, symbol, or device . . . used as a trademark to identify and distin-
guish the source of commercial goods or services.”67  The Supreme Court ex-
tended First Amendment protection to commercial speech in Virginia State 
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., where the 
Supreme Court recognized that consumers have an interest “in the free flow of 
commercial information.”68  Although the First Amendment now protects com-
mercial speech, more substantial free speech concerns can arise when a mark 
limits expressive speech.69   
When trademarks are used in expressive ways, courts have to balance the 
public’s interest in minimizing confusion as to the source of a good or product 
with the public’s interests in preserving its First Amendment freedom of ex-
pression.70  However, the interplay between First Amendment protections and 
trademark law is still partially unsettled, resulting in jurisdictions employing 
different doctrines – such as the “likelihood of confusion” test and the Rogers 
test – to analyze whether use of a trademark infringes on the trademark holder’s 
rights.71   
  
 64. 15 U.S.C § 1125 (2012). 
 65. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942). 
 66. McGeveran, supra note 7, at 1211. 
 67. Lisa P. Ramsey, Increasing First Amendment Scrutiny of Trademark Law, 61 
SMU L. REV. 383, 396 (2008). 
 68. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 
748, 763–65 (1976). 
 69. McGeveran, supra note 7, at 1211; see also Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. 
v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561–563 (1980) (stating, “The protection 
available for particular commercial expression turns on the nature both of the expres-
sion and of the governmental interests served by its regulation.  The First Amendment’s 
concern for commercial speech is based on the informational function of advertising.”).   
 70. McGeveran, supra note 7, at 1211; see, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, 
Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002); Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions, 
353 F.3d 792, 807 (9th Cir. 2003); Twentieth Century Fox Television v. Empire Dis-
trib., Inc., 875 F.3d 1192, 1196 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 71. 6 CALLMAN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 
22.61 (4th ed. 2018). 
7
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A.  “Likelihood of Confusion” Test 
Generally, in determining whether infringement claims brought under the 
Lanham Act have merit, courts consider whether the preexisting mark used by 
a subsequent user might spur a “likelihood of confusion” among consumers.72  
The likelihood of confusion test requires the plaintiff to prove it has a protect-
able trademark and that the defendant’s use of the mark will likely cause con-
fusion among “ordinarily prudent buyers . . . about the source of a product.”73  
When applying the likelihood of confusion test to claims brought under the 
Lanham Act, courts weigh various factors, such as the strength of the senior 
mark, the degree of similarity between the marks, and the defendant’s good 
faith in developing its own junior mark.74  This test, though “murky and plia-
ble,” usually “strikes a comfortable balance” between the Lanham Act and First 
Amendment protections of free expression.75 
However, the likelihood of confusion test does not apply to every trade-
mark case.  Popular trademarks often become part of the consumer’s vernacu-
lar.76  Trademarks such as “Barbie” become common terms that songs, books, 
and movies reference as a way to add expression to the underlying work.77  Al-
ternatively, a junior user may utilize the mark as a means of communication 
and “capitalize on knowledge common to speaker and listener.”78  In these in-
stances of expressive use, the applicability of the test breaks down because the 
public “is not very likely to be confused into believing that an expressively 
used trademark indicates any affiliation between the expressive user and the 
trademark holder.”79  When trademarks are used in this manner, the likelihood 
of confusion test is ill-suited to address infringement claims because it “ig-
nor[es] the First Amendment concerns implicated by the test.”80  In other 
words, the factors considered under the likelihood of confusion test are imma-
terial when considering expressive works because trademark use in that context 
rarely confuses consumers about the source of the work.81  
  
 72. Gordon v. Drape Creative, Inc., 909 F.3d 257, 264 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 73. Likelihood of Confusion, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 74. Byron, supra note 5, at 3. 
 75. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d at 900; McGeveran, supra note 
7, at 1214. 
 76. Byron, supra note 5, at 3. 
 77. Id. at 3–4.  
 78. Id. at 4–5.  For example, the mark “Google” is commonly used to refer to the 
search engine and also to describe the act of using the search engine, i.e. when you 
“google” something.  Id. at 3. 
 79. Id. at 4.  
 80. Daniel J. Wright, Explicitly Explicit: The Rogers Test and the Ninth Circuit, 
21 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 194, 216 (2013). 
 81. Id.  
8
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B.  The Rogers Test: Expressive Works Using Trademarks 
The Rogers test arose out of the difficulties presented by the likelihood of 
confusion test.82  The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
recognized the need for a different mode of analysis to address the problems 
posed by expressive works using trademarks and tackled this issue in Rogers 
v. Grimaldi.83  There, Hollywood performer Ginger Rogers filed suit against 
the producers and distributors of the film “Ginger and Fred,” which followed 
the story of two fictional Italian cabaret performers who imitated Rogers and 
her co-star, Fred Astaire.84  Rogers claimed the movie’s title created a false 
impression that the movie was about her or sponsored by her because her name 
was in the title of the work.85  The United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York granted summary judgment to the producers and distrib-
utors, concluding that the movie was a work of artistic expression and not a 
commercial product.86  Therefore, the district court held that the Lanham Act 
did not apply to titles of expressive works, and accordingly the movie was en-
titled to full First Amendment protection.87   
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling.88  However, it 
found the district court’s holding “unduly narrow[ed] the scope of the [Lan-
ham] Act,” reasoning that the holding would insulate movie titles almost en-
tirely from Lanham Act claims.89  The Second Circuit then ruled that the Lan-
ham Act could be applied to titles of expressive works.90  The court stated that 
“titles, like the artistic works they identify, are of a hybrid nature, combining 
artistic expression and commercial promotion.”91  The court then formulated 
the Rogers test to balance trademark rights and First Amendment rights: 
[The Lanham] Act should be construed to apply only to artistic works 
only where the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion out-
weighs the public interest in free expression . . . . [T]hat balance will 
normally not support application of the Act unless the title has no artis-
  
 82. Byron, supra note 5, at 5. 
 83. 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 84. Id. at 996–97. 
 85. Id. at 997. 
 86. Id.  
 87. Id.  
 88. Id. at 996.  
 89. Id. at 997.  
 90. Id. at 999.  
 91. Id. at 998.  
9
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tic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, or, if it has some ar-
tistic relevance, unless the title explicitly misleads as to the source or 
content of the work.
 92 
The Second Circuit’s rationale behind the Rogers test considered consum-
ers’ interest in not being misled and in “enjoying the results of the author’s 
freedom of expression.”93   
The original Rogers test consists of two prongs.94  The first prong applies 
when use of a mark has no artistic relevance to the underlying work.95  De 
minimis artistic relevance is sufficient to meet Rogers’ first prong.96  For ex-
ample, the Ninth Circuit found a band’s use of the term “Barbie” in a song 
titled “Barbie Girl” to be artistically relevant because the song was about Bar-
bie and the values she represented according to the band.97  If the use of mark 
has no artistic relevance, the Lanham Act will prohibit its use as trademark 
infringement because a “misleading [use] with no artistic relevance cannot be 
sufficiently justified by a free expression interest.”98  If a mark has artistic rel-
evance, the second prong applies when use of the mark in the expressive work 
explicitly misleads the consumer as to the source or content of the work.99  If 
either prong is met, the use of the mark will be prohibited as trademark in-
fringement.100  The Second Circuit found that the title at issue in Rogers had 
artistic relevance and did not explicitly mislead consumers as to the content or 
sponsorship of the defendants’ film.101  Therefore, Rogers’ claims under the 
Lanham Act were barred.102 
  
 92. Id. at 999.  The Second Circuit additionally rejected the “no alternative ave-
nues” argument articulated by Rogers. Id.  This standard applies when a title “is so 
intimately related to the subject matter of a work that the author has no alternative 
means of expressing what the work is about,” thereby implicating First Amendment 
concerns. Id. at 998.  The Second Circuit ultimately rejected the “no alternative ave-
nues” standard because it did not sufficiently accommodate public interest in free ex-
pression. Id. at 999. 
 93. Id. at 998.   
 94. MCCARTHY, supra note 4, at § 31:144:50. 
 95. Id.  
 96. E.S.S. Entm’t 2000 Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1097 (9th 
Cir. 2003). 
 97. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 98. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 99. MCCARTHY, supra note 4, at § 31:144:50. 
 100. Id.  
 101. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1001. “As [the producer] explains in an affidavit, Rogers 
and Astaire are to him ‘a glamorous and care-free symbol of what American cinema 
represented during the harsh times which Italy experienced in the 1930s and 1940s.’ In 
the film, he contrasts this elegance and class to the gaudiness and banality of contem-
porary television, which he satirizes.” Id. 
 102. Id.   
10
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The Rogers test is merely a defense to trademark infringement and does 
not involve a constitutional analysis even though its purpose is to protect free 
speech.103  The Supreme Court has previously held that a defense with an im-
bedded free speech protection is preferred to a constitutional analysis, as 
demonstrated in Eldred v. Ashcroft,104 a parallel copyright case: “[C]opyright’s 
built-in free speech safeguards are generally adequate to address [First Amend-
ment concerns].”105  Just as in copyright law, trademark law inherently protects 
the unauthorized use of a senior mark.106  Many trademark uses fall outside the 
realm of trademark protection because the mark is not used to identify the 
source of a good.107  In such instances, and as exemplified in Rogers, free 
speech concerns “pervade[] the common law of trademark.”108 
C.  Variations of the Rogers Test 
Though the Rogers test originated in the Second Circuit, other courts have 
adopted it as well, including the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth, 
Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits.109  No court has expressly rejected the 
Rogers test, although the Fourth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits still apply the like-
lihood of confusion test. 110  Appellate courts that have adopted the Rogers test 
apply it in essentially three different categories: the strict Rogers test, the quasi-
Rogers test, and the Rogers “rollercoaster test” of the Ninth Circuit.111  
1.  The Strict Rogers Test 
The first category – the strict Rogers test – applies the Rogers analysis as 
originally articulated by the Second Circuit.112  Under this approach, only ex-
plicitly misleading uses of a trademark are regulated under the Lanham Act and 
  
 103. MCCARTHY, supra note 4, at § 31:144:50. 
 104. 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 105. Id. at 221. 
 106. Pierre N. Leval, Trademark: Champion of Free Speech, 27 COLUM. J.L. & 
ARTS 187, 189 (2004). 
 107. Id. at 194. 
 108. Id. at 195.  
 109. See Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 664–65 
(5th Cir. 2000); Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 450 (6th Cir. 2003); Mattel, 
Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2002); Univ. of Ala. Bd. of 
Trustees v. New Life Art, Inc., 683 F.3d 1266, 1278 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 110. See Radiance Found., Inc. v. N.A.A.C.P., 786 F.3d 316, 324 (4th Cir. 2015); 
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’n, 28 F.3d 769, 774 (8th Cir. 1994); PAM Me-
dia, Inc. v. Am. Research Corp., 889 F. Supp. 1403, 1406 (10th Cir. 1995). 
 111. Byron, supra note 5, at 9. 
 112. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989). 
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implicitly misleading trademark uses are subjected to First Amendment protec-
tions and outside the reach of the Lanham Act.113   
The Eleventh Circuit falls within the strict Rogers category.114  In Uni-
versity of Alabama Board of Trustees v. New Life Art, a university brought suit 
against an artist for depicting the university’s football jerseys in his paintings, 
prints, and calendars memorializing notable football moments.115  The United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama initially applied the 
likelihood of confusion test and concluded that the artist’s use of the mark pro-
duced “merely some likelihood of confusion.”116  However, recognizing that 
paintings, prints, and calendars are entitled to First Amendment protection, the 
Eleventh Circuit, on appeal, adopted the Rogers test to balance the artist’s in-
terest in free speech and the university’s interest in trademark rights.117  The 
court found the artist’s use of the university’s mark to be artistically relevant 
because “the uniforms’ colors and designs [were] needed for a realistic por-
trayal of famous scenes from [the university’s] football history.”118  The court 
further concluded the artist’s works were not explicitly misleading because the 
artist’s use of the mark was “mere inclusion” and was substantially outweighed 
by the artist’s interest in expression.119  Therefore, the artist’s works did not 
infringe on the university’s trademark.120   
The Sixth Circuit similarly adopted this approach in Parks v. LaFace Rec-
ords.121  In Parks, civil rights icon Rosa Parks brought suit against a record 
producer and the rap duo OutKast for using her name in the title of their song 
Rosa Parks.122  After noting that many other jurisdictions had adopted the Rog-
ers test, the court explicitly rejected the likelihood of confusion test and deter-
mined the Rogers test was the best approach for balancing Parks’ trademark 
interests with OutKast’s First Amendment interests. .123   
In applying Rogers, the court held that the use of Parks’ name was not 
explicitly misleading because the song “ma[de] no explicit statement that the 
work [was] about [Rosa Parks] in any direct sense.”124  However, the Sixth 
Circuit found a triable issue of fact existed as to whether the song’s title was 
  
 113. Byron, supra note 5, at 10 (emphasis added). 
 114. See New Life Art, Inc., 683 F.3d at 1277–78. 
 115. Id. at 1270. 
 116. Id. at 1276. 
 117. Id. at 1279. 
 118. Id. at 1278–79.  
 119. Id. at 1279.  
 120. Id.  
 121. 329 F.3d 437, 452 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 122. Id. at 441.  
 123. Id. at 448–52.  The court adopted the Rogers test after looking at its application 
in a case from the Ninth Circuit where a band used the trademarked term “Barbie” in 
the title of their song. Id. at 451; see also Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc. 296 F.3d 
894 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 124. Parks, 329 F.3d at 459. 
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artistically relevant to the song itself.125  Leaning toward a finding of no artistic 
relevance, the court questioned the relevancy of the song’s title to the lyrics: 
“OutKast’s only explanation . . . is that the name Rosa Parks is a ‘symbol.’  It 
is, indeed, a symbol, but the question is how the symbol is artistically related 
to the content of a song that appears to be diametrically opposed to [the quali-
ties Rosa Parks represents].”126  The Sixth Circuit then remanded the case to 
decide this question.127   
2.  The Quasi-Rogers Category 
The second category adopts the theory behind Rogers but not its exact 
articulation, resulting in a quasi-Rogers test.128  The quasi-Rogers test, in com-
parison to the strict Rogers test, is somewhat less protective of expression and 
more protective of trademark holders’ rights.129 
The Second Circuit itself adopted this approach in Cliff Notes v. Bantam 
Doubleday Publishing shortly after Rogers was decided.130  In Cliff Notes, pub-
lishers of the study guide series Cliff Notes brought suit against the producers 
of a parody of the series called Spy Notes, alleging that the cover of Spy Notes 
gave consumers the impression that the parody was the publishers’ product.131 
The Southern District of New York granted a preliminary injunction 
against the producers of Spy Notes.132  On appeal, the Second Circuit recog-
nized the Rogers test only so far as to weigh “public interest in free expression 
against the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion.”133  The court rea-
soned that parodies, being expressive works, required more protection than or-
dinary commercial speech.134  The Second Circuit then expanded the second 
element of the Rogers test to include a likelihood of confusion analysis.135  In 
applying this quasi-Rogers test, the court held that the parodic nature of Spy 
Notes outweighed the likelihood of consumer confusion and vacated the in-
junction.136 
  
 125. Id. at 458.  
 126. Id. at 455–56. 
 127. Id. at 459.  
 128. Byron, supra note 5, at 12. 
 129. Id. at 14.  
 130. See Cliff Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Publ’g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 
494 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 131. Id. at 492.  
 132. Id. at 493.  
 133. Id. at 494.  
 134. Id. at 495.  
 135. Id.  
 136. Id. at 497.  
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The Fifth Circuit also adopted this approach to internal trademark use in 
expressive works.137  In Westchester Media v. PRL Doubleday Publishing, the 
Fifth Circuit applied the Rogers test when fashion designer Ralph Lauren 
brought an infringement suit against a magazine publisher for using Lauren’s 
“POLO” mark as a title.138  The court applied the likelihood of confusion test 
to determine whether use of the mark was explicitly misleading under the sec-
ond prong of Rogers and found that a likelihood of confusion existed between 
the magazine publishers and Lauren’s POLO marks.139 
3.  The Rogers Rollercoaster Category 
The third category is “more confusion-averse and expression unfriendly” 
in comparison to the other two categories.140  This category – dubbed here as 
the Rogers rollercoaster – is the most unfriendly to First Amendment protec-
tions in infringement actions and sporadically applies a partial likelihood of 
confusion test to Rogers analyses.141  The Ninth Circuit adopted this approach 
after deciding “the Barbie cases”142 and a case involving the popular video 
game Grand Theft Auto, but its application has been “somewhat facile” and 
“confusing.”143   
In the first Barbie case, Mattel v. MCA Records, the Ninth Circuit applied 
a strict interpretation of Rogers.144  Mattel, the manufacturer of Barbie dolls, 
brought claims under the Lanham Act against the music companies that pro-
duced the song “Barbie Girl” by the Danish band Aqua for using Barbie in the 
title of the song.145  The lyrics of the song “poke fun” at Barbie for the values 
she represents according to Aqua.146   
The Ninth Circuit applied Rogers in its analysis.147  Considering the lyrics 
of the song in relation to its title, the Ninth Circuit held that the use of Barbie 
  
 137. See Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 664–65 
(5th Cir. 2000). 
 138. Id. at 664–667. 
 139. Id. at 667.  
 140. Byron, supra note 5, at 15. 
 141. See generally Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 894 (9th Cir. 
2002); Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions, 353 F.3d 792, 797 (9th Cir. 
2003); E.S.S. Entm’t 2000 Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1097 (9th Cir. 
2003); Brown v. Elec. Arts. Inc., 724 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2013); Twentieth Century 
Fox Television v. Empire Distrib., Inc., 875 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 142. See infra note 144–62. 
 143. Byron, supra note 5, at 8; see also MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d at 894; Walk-
ing Mountain Productions, 353 F.3d at 796; E.S.S. Entm’t 2000 Inc., 547 F.3d at 1095.  
 144. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d at 902; Byron, supra note 5, at 8. 
 145. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d at 899.  
 146. Id. at 901.  
 147. Id. at 902.  
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in the song’s title was artistically relevant to the song itself.148  For the second 
prong of Rogers, the court found that the song title did not explicitly mislead 
consumers regarding the work’s origin because use of a trademark alone was 
not sufficient to satisfy the second prong of Rogers.149  If use of a mark alone 
was sufficient to meet Rogers’ second prong, the court reasoned, it would nul-
lify Rogers because such minimal use would automatically tip the balance in 
favor of protecting the rights of trademark holders without considering free 
speech interests.150  The court noted that trademark rights do not authorize the 
trademark owner to stifle a third party’s expressive use of the mark.151  Addi-
tionally, the court chose not to apply the likelihood of confusion test because it 
“failed to take account of the public’s interest in free expression” when “trade-
marks transcend their identifying purpose.”152  In light of these considerations, 
the court affirmed summary judgment for the music producers.153 
The Ninth Circuit next applied Rogers in the second Barbie case, Mattel 
v. Walking Mountain Productions.154  There, a photographer used Barbie dolls 
to produce photographs with social and political connotations and used Barbie 
in the title of his work.155  Mattel brought claims against the photographer un-
der the Lanham Act.156  The court considered the cultural significance of Barbie 
in its analysis: “Where a mark assumes such cultural significance, First 
Amendment protections come into play.”157  The court noted the role of the 
“Barbie” mark in modern culture, referencing the song at issue in MCA Rec-
ords.158  The Walking Mountain court then applied the Rogers test in essentially 
the same way as in MCA Records and held that the public’s interest in free 
expression outweighed the risk of consumer confusion about Mattel’s endorse-
ment of the photographer’s works.159  However, the Ninth Circuit, in noting 
that the term Barbie had become part of the public vernacular “outside the 
bounds of trademark law,”160 seemed to suggest Rogers only applied to the 
  
 148. Id.  
 149. Id.  
 150. Id. at 900.  
 151. Id.  
 152. Id.  
 153. Id. at 902.  
 154. Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions, 353 F.3d 792, 792 (9th Cir. 
2003). 
 155. Id. at 796.  In his photographs, photographer Thomas Forsythe depicted Barbie 
in the following manners: a nude Barbie on a vintage Hamilton Beach malt machine, a 
Barbie head in a fondue pot, and four Barbie dolls wrapped in tortillas, covered with 
salsa, lying in a casserole dish inside a lit oven. Id. 
 156. Id. at 797.  
 157. Id. at 807.  
 158. Id.  
 159. Id.  
 160. Id. (quoting Mattel Inc. v. MCA Records, 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
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unauthorized use of marks with a “transcendent meaning” that had become part 
of the culture.161 
The Ninth Circuit again employed Rogers in 2008 and expanded the test’s 
applicability beyond titles.162  In E.S.S. Entertainment 2000 v. Rock Star Vid-
eos, the owner of a strip club brought suit against the creators of the video game 
Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas under the Lanham Act for their portrayal of a 
strip club in the game that resembled the owner’s club.163  Addressing the first 
prong of Rogers, the Ninth Circuit held that a work’s artistic relevance must 
only be above zero to satisfy the first prong.164  However, unlike Walking 
Mountain, the court did not consider whether the owner’s club had any cultural 
significance.165 
The court then analyzed whether the use of the owner’s club explicitly 
misled consumers.166  The court posited that the relevant inquiry was whether 
the video game would make players think the club owner somehow sponsored 
the game.167  The court assessed the potential confusion with a partial likeli-
hood of confusion analysis, considering factors such as the similarity between 
the marks and the lack of evidence of actual confusion among consumers.168  
This analysis was significantly different than the Barbie cases where the Ninth 
Circuit did not utilize the likelihood of confusion test.169  Moreover, the Rock 
Star Videos court did not weigh the public interest in receiving the expres-
sion.170  The Ninth Circuit subsequently dismissed the strip club owner’s 
claims.171 
These three cases created tension within the Ninth Circuit pertaining to 
the application of the Rogers test, as exemplified in its progeny.  For instance, 
in 2013, Brown v. Electronic Arts explicitly rejected the likelihood of confu-
sion test – as in MCA Records – but did not consider the cultural significance 
of the mark at issue – as in Walking Mountain.172  But, in 2017 in Twentieth 
Century Fox Television v. Empire Distribution, the Ninth Circuit employed the 
likelihood of confusion test when considering the second prong of Rogers and 
  
 161. Id.; Wright, supra note 80, at 207.  
 162. E.S.S. Entm’t 2000 Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 
2003).  
 163. Id. at 1097.  
 164. Id. at 1100.  
 165. Id.  
 166. Id.  
 167. Id.  
 168. Id. at 1100–01.  
 169. See Wright, supra note 80, at 207–08. 
 170. E.S.S. Entm’t 2000 Inc., 547 F.3d at 1100–01; see Byron, supra note 5, at 15–
16.  
 171. E.S.S. Entm’t 2000 Inc., 547 F.3d at 1101. 
 172. Brown v. Elec. Arts Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1242 (9th Cir. 2013). 
16
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 11
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol84/iss3/11
2019] FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS IN TRADEMARK LAW 889 
considered whether the trademark had “attained a meaning beyond its source-
identifying function.”173 
The United States Supreme Court has yet to weigh in on the tangle of 
trademark tests as applicable to principles of free speech in expressive 
works,174 leaving district and circuit courts to decide which test to apply in a 
given case, resulting in disparate analyses.175  Instead of resolving the confu-
sion surrounding the Ninth Circuit’s application of Rogers and other trademark 
tests, Gordon merely adds to the uncertainty. 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
In its superseding opinion, the Ninth Circuit found that Defendants’ use 
of Gordon’s mark was artistically relevant and left the determination of 
whether Defendants’ use was explicitly misleading to the jury.176  The court 
expanded the “explicitly misleading” prong of Rogers to consider additional 
subfactors which relate to the junior user’s artistry and use.177  Further, the 
court stated that if a jury found Defendants’ use of the mark to be explicitly 
misleading, the use was not infringing unless the jury also determined a likeli-
hood of confusion existed between Defendants’ and Gordon’s use.178  
The Gordon court began its analysis by clarifying the burden of proof in 
a trademark infringement action under the Rogers test.179  The court stated that 
the burden of proof initially lies with the defendant to make a threshold show-
ing that “[the mark’s] allegedly infringing use is part of an expressive work 
protected by the First Amendment.”180  If the defendant makes this threshold 
  
 173. Twentieth Century Fox Television v. Empire Distrib., Inc., 875 F.3d 1192, 
1197–99 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 174. The most recent Supreme Court decision addressing trademark law was Matal 
v. Tam, where a rock band’s application for a trademark was denied based on a provi-
sion in the Lanham Act that prohibits the registration of a disparaging trademark. 137 
S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017).  There, the Supreme Court held that the disparagement pro-
vision in the Lanham Act violated First Amendment protections of speech. Id. at 1765. 
 175. See Wright, supra note 80, at 209; see e.g., Roxbury Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Pent-
house Media Group, Inc., 669 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1175–76 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (considering 
whether consumers would be misled as to the source of the defendant’s movie and not 
engaging in a likelihood of confusion analysis); Rebelution, LLC v. Perez, 732 F. Supp. 
2d 883, 887–88 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (applying the likelihood of confusion test and consid-
ering the cultural significance of the mark). 
 176. Gordon v. Drape Creative, Inc. 909 F.3d 257, 271 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 177. Id. at 270.  
 178. Id. at 264–65. 
 179. Id. at 264.  
 180. Id.  
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showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff,181 who then must meet one of Rog-
ers’ two prongs and also show that the defendant’s use is likely to cause con-
fusion.182   
The court quickly assessed whether Defendants met the burden of 
proof.183  Noting that greeting cards are expressive works entitled to First 
Amendment protections, the court found that Defendants met their initial bur-
den.184  This finding shifted the burden to Gordon “to raise a triable issue of 
fact as to at least one of Rogers’ two prongs.”185   
The court first considered whether the use of Gordon’s mark was artisti-
cally relevant to Defendants’ greeting cards.186  The court held as a matter of 
law that the mark was artistically relevant to the greeting cards because “the 
phrase is the punchline on which the cards’ humor turns.”187  Gordon therefore 
failed to meet Rogers’ first prong.188 
The court next addressed the second prong of Rogers.189  The court clari-
fied that when considering this prong the focus should be on the “nature of the 
junior user’s behavior rather than on the impact of the use.”190  The court also 
stated that use of a mark alone may sometimes be sufficient to meet the “ex-
plicitly misleading” prong of Rogers if consumers would normally identify the 
source by use of the mark alone.191  This statement departs from previous Ninth 
Circuit precedent, such as MCA Records and Rock Star Videos, which held that 
use of a trademark alone is insufficient to be explicitly misleading.192  The court 
distinguished those cases from Gordon, reasoning that in MCA Records and 
Rock Star Videos, no consumer would have related the use of the mark alone 
to the trademark holder.193  In Gordon, however, consumers could relate use of 
Gordon’s mark alone to identify him as the source of the work.194 
The court then articulated the first new subfactor under Rogers’ second 
prong: the degree to which the junior mark is used as compared to the senior 
mark.195  The court compared Gordon to MCA Records and Walking Mountain, 
cases where the junior mark was used in completely different ways than the 
  
 181. Id.  
 182. Id.  
 183. Id. at 268.  
 184. Id.  
 185. Id. at 269.  
 186. Id.  
 187. Id.  
 188. Id.  
 189. Id.  
 190. Id. (quoting Brown v. Elec. Arts Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1246–1246 (9th Cir. 
2013)) (internal marks omitted). 
 191. Id. at 270.  
 192. Id.  
 193. Id.  
 194. Id.  
 195. Id.  
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senior mark.196  The court reasoned this subfactor would prevent a junior user 
from alleging First Amendment protections “merely because the product being 
created by [the junior user] is also ‘art.’”197   
The second additional subfactor under the “explicitly misleading” prong 
of Rogers is “the extent to which the junior user has added his or her own ex-
pressive content to the work beyond the mark itself.”198  The Ninth Circuit ar-
ticulated its rationale behind adding this subfactor to the second prong of Rog-
ers: “[U]sing a mark as the centerpiece of an expressive work itself, unadorned 
with any artistic contribution by the junior user, may reflect nothing more than 
an effort to induce the sale of goods or services by confusion or lessen . . . the 
commercial value of a competitor’s mark.”199  The court found support for this 
proposition in previous Ninth Circuit cases, Rock Star Videos and Brown, 
where a junior mark was incorporated into the body of an expressive work only 
as a component of the larger work.200  Considering these cases, this new sub-
factor is similar to the court’s holding in its previous opinion.201    
After incorporating these new subfactors to the Rogers test, the court de-
clined to declare as a matter of law that Defendants’ use of Gordon’s mark was 
explicitly misleading.202  The Ninth Circuit pointed out that Defendants gener-
ally pasted Gordon’s mark into their greeting cards.203  Additionally, the court 
noted that in some of the greeting cards, Defendants used Gordon’s mark with-
out any other text.204  Therefore, the court found that a triable issue of fact 
existed as to whether Defendants added their own expression to its greeting 
cards in using Gordon’s mark or merely used Gordon’s mark in the same man-
ner as Gordon.205  The Ninth Circuit accordingly remanded the case.206 
V.  COMMENT 
The Rogers test is inconsistently applied, particularly within the Ninth 
Circuit, as is apparent in its case law. Some courts still utilize the likelihood of 
confusion test; others apply one of the three categories of Rogers tests.207  The 
Ninth Circuit’s superseding opinion in Gordon falls into the quasi-Rogers test 
  
 196. Id. 
 197. Id.  
 198. Id.  
 199. Id. (quoting S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 
539 (1987)). 
 200. Id.  
 201. Gordon v. Drape Creative, Inc., 897 F.3d 1184, 1196 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 202. Gordon, 909 F.3d at 271. 
 203. Id. at 261.  
 204. Id. at 271.  
 205. Id.  
 206. Id.  
 207. See supra Part III. 
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category because it adds a likelihood of confusion analysis to the Rogers test.208  
The subfactors articulated by the court, however, blur the lines between the 
Rogers test and the likelihood of confusion test.  Moreover, though the Ninth 
Circuit seemingly departed from its previous holding that required a junior user 
to add his own artistry to his underlying work, the court tucked this previous 
holding under the second prong of Rogers in its new opinion.   
The outcome of this case raises free speech concerns.  Gordon’s holding 
may result in a chilling effect on creators’ freedom of expression.  Junior users 
may refrain from creating new works out of concern for exposure to complex 
litigation.  Additionally, Gordon drives the wedge deeper into the circuit split 
among courts that employ the Rogers test.209   
A.  Implications of the Gordon Decision 
Gordon adds to the turmoil within the Ninth Circuit and further splits the 
circuits regarding expressive use in trademark infringement cases.  This, in 
turn, makes trademark litigation more difficult and uncertain.  In addition, the 
uncertainty and the cost of litigating these claims further isolates artists.  The 
likelihood of confusion test already requires long, fact-intensive, and expensive 
litigation, and those problems are amplified when courts use a quasi-Rogers 
test.210   
Professor William McGeveran argues the possibility of costly litigation 
discourages people from engaging in permissible activities related to trade-
marks that the law would otherwise allow and should encourage.211  In sup-
porting this stance, Professor McGeveran cites to the defendant photographer 
from Walking Mountain who revealed that his overall costs for litigating his 
defense exceeded two million dollars, a cost hardly affordable for artists and 
small businesses.212   
The expense of litigation combined with the uncertainty of the applicable 
test chills the free expression of junior users.  Individuals may be less inclined 
to create because of the looming threat of liability.  But even if an individual is 
not subject to liability, the cost of reaching that outcome through the judicial 
system is not worth the expense.213  Even those who can afford to defend ex-
pressive trademark use take excessive precautions to eliminate the possibility 
of a dispute.  For example, Google allows trademark holders to ban the use of 
their marks in third party advertisements and reality television producers blur 
  
 208. Gordon, 909 F.3d at 257. 
 209. See MCCARTHY, supra note 4, at § 31.139; Ramsey, supra note 68, at 386. 
 210. McGeveran, supra note 7, at 1221. 
 211. See McGeveran, supra note 36, at 62. 
 212. Id.  This amount includes the cost for both the trademark and copyright claims 
raised in the suit. Id. at 62–63.  
 213. Id.  
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out unlicensed trademark logos that appear on television.214  These extra pre-
cautions are far beyond legal requirements, yet these junior users take these 
unnecessary measures to avoid costly litigation. 
Moreover, the Gordon decision blurs the lines between the second prong 
of Rogers and the likelihood of confusion test, which will further complicate 
litigation.  The first subfactor, concerning the similarity of use between the 
junior and senior marks, is similar to factors considered in the likelihood of 
confusion test, such as the similarity between the marks and the strength of the 
senior mark.215  The Ninth Circuit noted that the “explicitly misleading” prong 
of Rogers is principally a more demanding version of the likelihood of confu-
sion test and that “a plaintiff who satisfies the ‘explicitly misleading’ portion 
of Rogers should therefore have little difficulty showing a likelihood of confu-
sion.”216  A likelihood of confusion analysis serves no purpose if the same fac-
tors are applied and the outcome of the likelihood of confusion test will be the 
same as under the Rogers test.  Requiring an additional likelihood of confusion 
is therefore superfluous and will only lengthen and complicate litigation. 
Issues arise with the second subfactor articulated by the Gordon opinion 
as well.  This subfactor – whether the junior user added expressive content to 
the underlying work – reflects the Ninth Circuit’s original holding, which 
looked to whether the junior user added his own artistry to the underlying 
work.217  The court merely used “expressive content” as a stand-in for “art-
istry.”218  The difference between the two opinions is that the court slotted this 
inquiry into Rogers’ second prong instead of the first prong.219  However, the 
effect remains the same because the junior user still must show that he added 
his own expression, which creates an added barrier to permissible free speech 
in expressive works.220 
In his amicus curiae brief, Stanford University Professor Mark Lemley 
urged that Defendants’ use of HBDC and HBDGS were not source-identifying 
uses of Gordon’s mark and therefore, trademark law should not protect Gor-
don’s property right in the mark.221  The original Rogers test distinguished be-
tween using a mark in an expressive way and using a mark to identify the 
source of a company’s goods or services.222  The Rogers test required only 
  
 214. Id. at 63.  
 215. S. Cal. Darts Ass’n v. Zaffina, 762 F.3d 921, 930 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 216. Gordon v. Drape Creative, Inc., 909 F.3d 257, 272 n.7 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 217. Gordon v. Drape Creative, Inc., 897 F.3d 1184, 1196 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 218. Id. at 1194–95.  
 219. Id.  
 220. Gordon, 909 F.3d at 271.  
 221. Brief Amici Curiae of 37 Intellectual Property Law Professors in Support of 
Appellees’ Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at 4, Gordon v. Drape 
Creative, Inc., 909 F.3d 257 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 16-56715). 
 222. Id. at 7.  
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minimal relevance to trigger First Amendment protection.223  This low bar al-
lowed artists to express themselves and not feel inhibited by the possibility of 
a trademark infringement action.  But Gordon’s holding raises the bar.  A de-
fendant now must add expressive content to his underlying work, a requirement 
that parallels the previous Gordon opinion.224  This requirement, Lemley urged, 
invades the realm of copyright law.225  Lemley argued that the overextension 
of trademark rights in Gordon could be prevented by “recognizing that Gordon 
has a right to use his phrase as a trademark for a line of greeting cards but not 
a trademark right in the [punchline] of a joke.”226   
Although trademark law should give reasonable notice of the standard a 
court will apply, courts should generally avoid a constitutional analysis of 
trademark law if the action can be resolved on other grounds.227  The Rogers 
test as originally articulated by the Second Circuit is not a constitutional anal-
ysis, but the test inherently incorporates First Amendment concerns by protect-
ing trademarks used in an expressive manner.228  Constitutional decisions are 
known to freeze the development of law, which could negatively impact the 
development of the Lanham Act because the Act relies on common law stand-
ards.229  To achieve this aim, courts should interpret trademark claims narrowly 
and trademark defenses broadly to protect expression, meaning that some con-
fusion may be necessary for the sake of preserving rights of expression under 
the First Amendment.230   
The Supreme Court has noted that a little confusion may be tolerated in 
order to protect freedom of speech:  
The common law’s tolerance of a certain degree of confusion on the 
part of consumers followed from the very fact that . . . an originally 
descriptive term was selected to be used as a mark, not to mention the 
  
 223. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.3d 994, 999 (2d. Cir. 1989); E.S.S. Entm’t 2000 
Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 224. Gordon, 909 F.3d at 270. 
 225. Brief Amici Curiae of 37 Intellectual Property Law Professors in Support of 
Appellees’ Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at 14, Gordon v. Drape 
Creative, Inc., 909 F.3d 257 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 16-56715). 
 226. Id. at 15.  
 227. See e.g., Pierre N. Leval, Trademark: Champion of Free Speech, 27 COLUM. 
J.L. & ARTS 187, 188–89, 209 (2004); McGeveran, supra note 7, at 1211–14; see also 
Freecycle Network, Inc. v. Oey, 505 F.3d 898, 906 n.16 (9th Cir. 2007) (declining to 
rule on the First Amendment challenge after finding for defendant on other grounds).  
 228. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.3d 994, 998 (2d. Cir. 1989). 
 229. McGeveran, supra note 7, at 12. 
 230. Ramsey, supra note 67, at 448. 
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undesirability of allowing anyone to obtain a complete monopoly on 
use of a descriptive term simply by grabbing it first.231   
Moreover, applying trademark law to prevent otherwise permissible 
speech should require strong justification.232  Strong justification is absent, 
however, when a mark is used within an expressive work as it has little, if any, 
effect on the senior mark.233  A minute chance of confusion should not out-
weigh First Amendment speech protections.  The Ninth Circuit recognized this 
in Rock Star Videos – few people would have believed the strip club owner was 
connected with the makers of Grand Theft Auto.234   
B.  Suggestions and Recommendations 
The Ninth Circuit should increase consistency in its application of the 
Rogers test.  The quasi-Rogers test articulated in Gordon only adds to the con-
fusion of the test’s application in the Ninth Circuit.  Adopting a strict Rogers 
test would remedy the inconsistency within the Ninth Circuit and simplify liti-
gation for defendants who wish to defend their expressive use of trademarks. 
The original Rogers test, as articulated by the Second Circuit, recognized 
that confusion was not the only concern in third party trademark use – First 
Amendment protections need to be addressed as well.235  Restricting use of a 
mark because of slight confusion infringes on the public’s right to free speech 
and expression.  If a trademark is not used to source-identify, then consumer 
interest in free expression should outweigh application of the Lanham Act.236  
A strict Rogers test would allow permissible expressive speech to trump a mi-
nute risk of confusion.   
Weighing the likelihood of confusion in the junior mark merely lengthens 
and adds expense to litigation.  A strict application of Rogers would eliminate 
the likelihood of confusion analysis entirely, along with other unnecessary con-
siderations, such as whether a defendant added his own expressive content to 
his work, thereby shortening litigation and removing the chilling effect on free 
speech.  Moreover, this would provide much needed consistency in the Ninth 
Circuit for future infringement actions.  
The application of the Rogers test is an issue ripe for the Supreme Court’s 
review.  If the Supreme Court were to hear a case involving this issue, it could 
resolve the inconsistencies across the United States.  This would provide guid-
ance to both trademark holders and junior users as to what test a court will 
  
 231. See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 
122 (2004) [KP Permanent I]. 
 232. McGeveran & McKenna supra note 10, at 305. 
 233. Id.  
 234. E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1097 (9th 
Cir. 2008). 
 235. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989). 
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23
Kramer: Honey Badger Does Care About First Amendment Protections in Trade
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2019
896 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84  
apply in trademark infringement actions. Until that time, the Ninth Circuit 
needs to create consistency within its own courts to protect and properly bal-
ance First Amendment and trademark rights. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Gordon adds to the tangled web that is the Ninth Circuit’s approach to 
trademark infringement and contributes to the Rogers test circuit split.  The 
Ninth Circuit, though it issued a superseding opinion, stood by its controversial 
application of Rogers.  The court’s holding further splits circuits on the issue, 
which makes defending expressive trademark use a complex and expensive 
process for litigants.  Lengthy and costly litigation will deter artists and creators 
from using trademarks in an otherwise permissible manner and chill this type 
of work.  The effect of Gordon’s overly broad application of the Rogers test 
may endanger First Amendment free speech principles. 
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